heh heh heh.

stole this from cesperanza.

</td><td valign="top">You are a geek liaison, which means you go both ways. You can hang out with normal people or you can hang out with geeks which means you often have geeks as friends and/or have a job where you have to mediate between geeks and normal people. This is an important role and one of which you should be proud. In fact, you can make a good deal of money as a translator.

Normal: Tell our geek we need him to work this weekend.

You [to Geek]: We need more than that, Scotty. You'll have to stay until you can squeeze more outta them engines!

Geek [to You]: I'm givin' her all she's got, Captain, but we need more dilithium crystals!

You [to Normal]: He wants to know if he gets overtime.

</td>

You are 34% geek

Take the Polygeek Quiz at Thudfactor.com

ugh. ugh.

due monday afternoon, six to eight pages on some topic relating to the philosophy of language.

this is a course that has been driving me bananas since the beginning of the semester, largely because it's less language and more philosophy, and i've got to tell you, while these particular students and this particular professor are very nice?, serious students of philosophy tend to piss me off with the "suppose" and "but what if" and "then how do you know" and whatnot. who cares?!, is my feeling, the language is there and you know that the words mean what they mean -- it's ludicrous even to suggest that they might not mean what they mean, because if they didn't, why would they be there?

philosophy and me, we weren't cut out for each other.

so the prompt is this:

As discussed by Russell in "Descriptions", Meinong argues that if an expression such as 'the present king of France' is to be meaningful, there must be (in some sense of 'be') something to which it refers. Please formulate that line of reasoning. Next, explain how Russell would challenge that line of reasoning in light of his distinction between "grammatical subjects" and "logically proper names". In your answer please be sure to explain how Russell would characterize the "logical form" of sentences containing (a) indefinite descriptions, and (b) definite descriptions. Please also explain how, on Russell's view, sentences containing both definite descriptions and negations can be structurally ambiguous. Finally, does Russell's approach, if correct, prove that there are no round squares or unicorns? Please explain your answer.

i can get behind all the use of "please", but dude! look at this! "in some sense of 'be'", forsooth! it's like the fucking clinton impeachment trials all over again.

am seriously considering bagging this and going with the other prompt instead, the one that goes:

What difficulties face the view that all meaning is a matter of naming? In your answer be sure to consider the view that sentences might comprise lists of names.

have been thinking about this since waking up tuesday morning. words written: 0.